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The Environmental Defense Centers (EDCs) of Brazil provide response services following oil spill acci-
dents. EDCs near affected areas rapidly organize and execute emergency response activities in order to
minimize the environmental and economic impacts of spills. The current research applied ergonomic
principles and methods (interviews, direct observation and focus groups) to describe common EDC
system operations, and to identify constraints and conﬂicting procedural practices. Results of ergonomic
ﬁeld studies were modeled and analyzed using the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM),
which can show how functional variability in planning, preparedness, execution, resources, economic
and human factors affect the quality of emergency response activities. The FRAM analyses provide
guidance for improving the resilience of oil spill emergency response systems.
© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The risk of spilling oil into the environment is inherent to the
petroleum processing industry. Up to 8.8 million tons of oil are
unintentionally released into the environment each year, with
most spills directly related to human activities (Fingas, 2011). The
effects of these spills are all too apparent: dead wildlife, oil-
covered marshlands and contaminated water being chief
among them. Oil spills can occur during several points in the “life
cycle” of petroleum processing, including during oil exploration
and production, transport (by vessel, railroad, tanker truck, or
pipeline), reﬁning, storage, consumption or usage, and waste
disposal.
Major accidents in the petroleum industry have increased global
awareness of the risks of oil spills, the damage they cause to the
ecosystem, and impacts on human activities (Alkazimi and
Grantham, 2015). Impacts of these accidents include ﬁnancial
costs of oil spill recovery activities and regulatory ﬁnes, a loss of.V. Cabrera Aguilera),
ferris@tamu.edu (T.K. Ferris),
r (P.V.R. Carvalho).natural resource and processing labor, damage to the environment,
and injuries to workers and the public (Carvalho and Vidal, 2001).
In addition to human-caused (e.g., accident-related) spills, oil and
hazardous oil products can be released following natural disasters
such as earthquakes and hurricanes (Cruz and Krausmann, 2009),
thus imposing a threat irrespective of the commercial demand for
petroleum products.
To mitigate and minimize the major impacts of oil spills,
specialized organizations that are part of the Global Response
Network (GRN) share information and provide centers of expertise
in spill preparedness, response performance and recovery tech-
niques. One such organization, the Environmental Defense Center
(EDC) of Brazil, is responsible for establishing and maintaining ca-
pabilities to respond to oil spills of any size, anywhere in Brazil. As a
complex socio-technical system, the effectiveness of EDC opera-
tions depends on effectiveness in managing the large degrees of
variability and unpredictability that characterize interactions
among humans, equipment, technology, and organizational
components.
This article introduces the results of an investigation of EDC
operations during responses to major oil spills. Ergonomic ﬁeld
studies provided direct observation, interview, and focus group
data which were used to construct a system model that could be
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model was then analyzed using the Functional Resonance Analysis
Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel, 2004, 2012). FRAM is particularly well-
suited for mapping dynamic dependencies in complex systems. It is
used to provide a better understanding about how functional
variability in planning, preparedness, execution, resource avail-
ability, economic factors, and human factors affect emergency
response actions. The results of FRAM analyses can provide infor-
mation for ways to increase the overall resilience of such systems.
The notion of modeling and mapping dynamic dependencies
with systemic models and especially FRAM is already used in
several contexts (computer science, ecological sciences, medicine),
some in relation to industrial safety applications (Nouvel et al.,
2007; Lundberg et al., 2009; Herrera and Woltjer, 2010; Carvalho,
2011; Belmonte et al., 2011). Nevertheless, as indicated by
Underwood and Waterson (2013) there is a gap between research
and practicewhich could hinder the awareness, adoption and usage
of systemic models.1.1. Response to oil spills
Despite all preventive actions being taken by the industry, an oil
spill can be seen as a normal accident, using Perrow (1984) deﬁni-
tion of normal as something not desired or prescribed but that can
happen due the nature of processes involved. Recovery from
normal accidents such as oil spills can be managed through the
combined efforts of system elements in the presence of adequate
resources to mitigate or minimize the harm (e.g., to the environ-
ment, ﬁnances, etc.). Managing oil spill recovery, however, involves
additional factors that require precise, fast and coordinated actions
that take into account the type of oil spilled, the location of the
spillage, the proximity of the spill to sensitive environments, and
other environmental factors.
International practices use principles of tiers preparedness and
response to establish suitable capabilities to adequately cope with
oil spills at the local, regional, national and international levels. The
tiers serve to categorize spills in terms of their potential severity.
Each tier can be escalated to the next, depending on the scale of the
event and its development over time. Spill responders consider a
range of factors in each emergency response scenario that may
inﬂuence planning processes as well as the nature of the plan, with
regard to required equipment, people and other operational ex-
penses. Considering mostly the primary factors of size and location
of a spill, the three tiers can be deﬁned as:
 Tier 1: spills occurring near or at an operator's own facilities and
having a relatively minor impact on operations. Most petroleum
processing industrial facilities should have sufﬁcient capability
on-site to respond tier 1 spills.
 Tier 2: spills larger in size and/or further from available response
resources, thus requiring resources beyond the tier 1 capability.
A broader range of stakeholdersmay be involved in the response
than a single industrial facility.
 Tier 3: spills that are likely to cause major national and inter-
national ecological impacts due to their scale. Tier 3 spills may
require substantial resources from a range of national and in-
ternational sources (Barber and Varghese, 2012).
Oil spill response emerges as a balance between conﬂicting
objectives: removing and potentially recovering the spilled oil from
the spill site, causing minimal further harm to the environment,
and accounting for available resources and worker safety issues.
Response activities and strategies can be summarized as: Salvage operation actions: Preventative measures can be put in
place to slow the development of an oil spill and make it more
manageable/less costly in a spill occurrence. Salvage operation
actions commonly involve installation of salvage control units
around areas that may be sensitive to spills. For example, semi-
permanently installed preventative or protection booming can
be used as barriers to impede the ﬂow of oil over the surface of
water.
 Mechanical containment and recovery of spilled oil: in the event of
a spill, mechanical containment activities can be executed to
prevent the spilled oil from reaching where it is most damaging,
such as in shallow water or on the shoreline. Mechanical
containment operations can involve deploying booms to corral
the spilled oil on the surface of a body of water. The controlled
oil can then be recovered using skimmers or vacuum devices
and return it to a secure containment.
 Usage of oil spill dispersants: Oil spill dispersants are chemicals
that can be sprayed into spilled oil to facilitate its rapid removal
from the water surface, or to allow it to disperse into the water
at concentrations that are minimally impactful.
The EDC in Brazil uses a varied combination of these activities
and strategies in contingency and emergency situations in part-
nership with national and international petroleum processing in-
dustries. This facilitates speeded response to spills by providing
capabilities where the oil is produced, transported, stored and
consumed, with the dual goals of protecting the environment while
minimizing operational costs and safety risks.
The EDC was created in 2000 after a series of major spill acci-
dents, shown in Table 1, culminating with an accident involving a
rupture in the Rio de Janeiro reﬁnery's pipeline. This catastrophic
event resulted in a spill of 1.2 million liters of oil in the Guanabara
Bay, affecting several areas such as rivers, beaches, mangroves, and
other protected areas (Carvalho and Vidal, 2001).
As of 2015, there are nine EDC centers located at strategic points
around Brazil: Amazo^nia, Maranh~ao, Rio Grande do Norte, Bahia,
Centro-Oeste, Bacia de Campos, Rio de Janeiro, S~ao Paulo, Minas
Gerais. The proximity of the EDCs to petroleum activities can be
seen in Fig. 1.
The EDC system operates seven days a week, 24 h a day to
support contingency plans for local (tier 1) spills through Opera-
tional Units associated with oil processing industrial facilities, and
can mobilize to add their capabilities in addressing larger-scale
(higher tier) spills as well. Each EDC Operational Unit must be
prepared to respond to tier 1 emergencies within distances of
approximately 250 miles in no more than 8 h. They may also be
called upon if the size and/or location of higher-tiered spills require
their mobilization. Fig. 2 illustrates how each type of response in-
volves different elements of planning, equipment, people and other
operational expenses. In addition to considering the spill tier, four
types of response kits must be ready to move as they can be
specialized for activities on land, on a beach, inmaritimewater or in
rivers.
2. Complex system modelling
According to Hollnagel (2012) many socio-technical systems
have reached levels of complexity that make them very hard (or
even impossible) to model linearly with a complete system
description. Nevertheless, most conventional models use linear
chains of events to describe the system without adequately
considering interacting environmental, organizational, or human
contributions. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA) and Cause-Consequence
Analysis are based on this approach (Leveson, 1995).
Table 1
Major oil spill events in Brazil before EDC creation.
Date Qt. (liters) Place Description
01/94 350 th. Campos, RJ Leak in the connection rig - ship
05/94 2.7 million S. Sebasti~ao, SP Pipeline breaking, oil to the sea
03/97 600 th. Guanabara Bay, RJ Leak in the pipeline PE-II
03/98 10 th. Guanabara Bay, RJ Oil leak during the shipment
06/98 6 th. Salvador, Bahia Leak of petroleum in the sea
12/98 N. A. Betim, BH Naphtha leak followed by explosion
10/98 1 million S. Paulo, SP Crack in pipeline threw oil in river
04/99 5 th. S. Sebasti~ao, SP Leak in pipeline caused by ﬂaw in valve
04/99 500 Salvador, Bahia Break of oil tanker pipeline
01/00 1.5 milion Guanabara Bay, RJ Leak in the pipeline PE-II
Fig. 1. Environmental defense centers in Brazil.
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the activity system (Engestron, 2000) adaptive units can be intro-
duced to manage performance and goals that have fundamental
trade-offs (Woods, 2011). Areas of thought such as those espoused
by Resilience Engineering (RE) offer a new paradigm for analyzing
complex systems by taking into account the positive contributions
of people at all levels of the organization. RE research has been
conducted in several complex environments, including petro-
chemical and chemical processing (Azadeh et al., 2014; Shiralia
et al., 2012), aviation (Dekker et al., 2008; Zimmermann et al.,
2011), industrial processes (Dinh et al., 2012) and electricity dis-
tribution (Saurin and Carim Junior, 2011).
The concern and practical focus when implementing RE in a
complex system is the adaptive capacity, or the ability of the system
to identify and to adapt to handle unanticipated perturbations in
order to keep the system under control (Woods, 2006). REconsiders accidents as emergent events that can occur during
normal system functioning and thus can be managed with a thor-
ough understanding of this functionality (Hollnagel, 2004). RE de-
ﬁnes system failures as the “ﬂip side” of adaptations necessary to
cope with the complexity of the real world during normal system
functions. System modeling (and safety management) can effec-
tively support RE analysis by systematically understanding how
functions are carried out in everyday operations, with equipment
functioning normally and in a normally structured organization
(Carvalho et al., 2008, 2009). Following this perspective, new
methods and techniques have been developed such as the System-
Theoretic Accident Models (STAMP), Cognitive Reliability and Error
Analysis Method (CREAM), Driver Reliability and Error Model
(DREAM) and the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM).
These models have been used effectively by resilience engineers to
analyze complex socio-technical systems for risk assessment
Fig. 2. Edc emergency plans.
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For the current research, the Functional Resonance Analysis
Method (FRAM) based on RE principles was selected for several
reasons. First, it is appropriate for modeling the complexities
inherent to the socio-technical system of oil spill emergency
response in a nonlinear manner. Second, it supports data-driven
analysis through function instantiations that can be used to
observe how coupled functional elements can support dynamic
propagation of events. Finally, analysis of the FRAMmodel provides
valuable information about variability in the system, and empha-
sizes the role of humans in this variability, as well as in imple-
menting resilientmanagement strategies. Ultimately, it can provide
a guidelines for how human operators (individually and collec-
tively) can make adaptive adjustments to system variability and
achieve acceptable system performance levels under both normal
and abnormal conditions.
2.1. Functional resonance analysis method FRAM
FRAMwas originally developed for accident analysis (Hollnagel,
2004). However, it can also be used as an alternative approach to
risk assessment (Riana and Terje, 2011; Lundberg, 2010) and system
modeling, bringing a new paradigm to manage and understand
safety in complex socio-technical systems (Hollnagel, 2014). FRAM
adopts a systemic and non-linear qualitative approach for system
modelling and analysis by describing the normal performance
variability within a socio-technical system. Instantiations of system
functions serve to identify dynamic propagations of events that are
key to this model. Variability in measured outcomes (such as per-
formance, safety, etc.) is therefore introduced in socio-technical
systems as an emergent property that is attributable to individualand collective/interacting human behavior during normal opera-
tions. Unexpected situations arise from higher degrees of this
variability.
The four RE principles on which the FRAM is based are
(Hollnagel, 2004):
(1) The equivalence of failures and successes: failures and suc-
cesses are equally informative in the sense that both emerge
from the same system functions, but under varied condi-
tions. The success and failures of a socio-technical system
depends on the ability of organizations, groups and in-
dividuals to anticipated risks and taking appropriate adap-
tive control actions.
(2) The approximate adjustments: the performance of socio-
technical systems always varies due to internal and
external factors. Adjustments are normal and needed to
perform everyday activities. The impact of these adjustments
depends on the degree to which unusual situations are
speciﬁed and the availability of sufﬁcient resources.
(3) The principle of emergence: Emergent outcomes are by
deﬁnition caused by the interaction of several factors,
therefore speciﬁc events have to be reconstructed in the
system to be observed, rather than analyzing individual
components in isolation. Although performance variability is
always present even in normal operations, the sources of
variability depend on the particular situation. Therefore,
failures and normal system operation cannot sufﬁciently be
described linearly, as in a cause/effect relation.
(4) The principle of functional resonance: This principle states
that patterns of variability may “resonate” among a group of
system functions. Tight system couplings among these
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of exceeding a system‘s safety limits, potentially leading to an
accident. Understanding this functional resonance can help
modelers explain normal but otherwise undetectable vari-
ability in other system functions and outcome measures
(Hollnagel, 2004, 2012).
FRAM allows describing system couplings and dependencies
among functions, andmodeling the evolution of these relationships
to assess the potential variability of each function. The FRAM
method then emphasizes analysis of this characteristic variability
to better anticipate future adverse events (Hollnagel, 2012).
The FRAM method can be summarized with the following pro-
cedural steps:
 Step 0: Deﬁnition of the purpose for modeling the system and
the particular scenario to be analyzed.
 Step 1: Identiﬁcation and description of the essential system
functions. These functions are characterized in terms of six as-
pects (Table 2).
 Step 2: Assessment and evaluation of normal variability for each
singular function by using a set of Common Performance Con-
ditions (CPCs) (Hollnagel, 2012). CPCs should be deﬁned such
that they have a clear individual or interacting inﬂuence on the
performance variability for each particular function. The eval-
uation of CPCs is integrated with information extracted from
incident and accident databases and from retrospective verbal
protocols that illustrate near-misses that may otherwise be
undocumented.
 Step 3: Identiﬁcation of functional resonance that could emerge
from the propagation of variability from one function
throughout the system. This identiﬁcation starts by deﬁning
possible dependencies (couplings) among functions. The prop-
agation of variability may be both direct via the output from a
function or indirect through interacting effects with variability
from other CPCs.
 Step 4: Identiﬁcation of effective countermeasures to manage
the performance variance. These countermeasures should aim
to dampen performance variability or better tolerate it
(Hollnagel, 2012).3. Method
This study modeled and analyzed the Brazilian EDC's oil spill
response system using FRAM, a systemic modelling framework that
emphasizes performance variability, with the goal of assessing the
resilience and safety of EDC operations.
To collect data about daily operational work, we used principles
and methods from Ergonomics (Wilson, 2000) and Cognitive Task
Analysis (Crandall et al., 2006). These included individual and focus
group interviews with operators and other stakeholders, and directTable 2
Aspects of a function.
Function Description
Aspect
Input: What is used or transformed during the performance of the function in
Output: Is the outcome produce by the function and constitute the main connect
the output shows the potential but not the actual coupling among func
Precondition: Conditions that must be completed or established before a function can
Resource: In order to a function proceed, requires some resources or needs to con
Control: Every process or function demand any sort of control to monitor and ad
Time: Regard to the available time, it can be consider as an special kind of res
activity.observation of work activities during simulated response exercises.
These methods provided a detailed perspective on how people
think and reason in the complex, dynamic settings that charac-
terize real-world tasks. The data collection methods also empha-
sized human interactions with other system elements in the work
environment, including technologies, tools, work conditions,
stressors, and team dynamics, revealing fundamental trade-offs in
normal operation. The data obtained was then categorized and
used as input for FRAM modelling.3.1. Participants
Thirty-two employees of the EDC representing different orga-
nizational and operational roles participated in the data collection
activities. Table 3 gives an overview of the positions and experience
levels of participants. Participatory interactions (Wilson, 2000)
were additionally carried out with the most experienced ﬁeld op-
erators, the manager of the EDC, operating leaders and the opera-
tions coordinator. All participants had prior experience working as
ﬁeld operators for at least two years except the Business Unit (BU)
ﬁscal ofﬁcer, whose role is to serve as liaison between represen-
tatives of the oil company and the EDC. The analytical results were
validated with these same operating leaders and with the opera-
tions coordinator.3.2. Data collection
Using ergonomic ﬁeld studies, the study team observed and
interviewed workers in their actual work setting, following the
following basic procedure: (1) analysis of existing documentation,
(2) register information while interacting with observed actors, (3)
hypothesis formulation about possible variation in the activities
and (4) validation with the subjects (Carvalho et al., 2008). These
methods rely on direct access to practitioners, experts and expe-
rienced workers who hold the tacit competencies necessary for
daily work (Gomes et al., 2009). The aim of these activities was to
understand how and why work is done, and to identify types of
variability in worker activities, as well as the relationships among
constraints and contradictions and variability.
Preliminary documentation analyses and the ﬁeld study took
place over 1.5 years in 20 separate visits to EDC Operational Units.
Analyzed documentation included actuation protocols, standard
processes of the environmental defense center, daily reports of
occurrence (DROs), response strategies for oil spill Incidents, gen-
eral safety rules, and reﬁnery internal regulations. These docu-
ments provided an initial comprehension of general activities and
equipment used during an oil spill occurrence. The research group
familiarized itself with the tasks as deﬁned and the regulatory
structure related to oil spill response systems.order to produce the outputs.
or to the input of previous functions. This correspondence between the input and
tions.
be held.
sume.
just the activity when is need.
ource or constraint, in the sense of there is a period of time - a duration - for an
Table 3
People interviewed.
Participant's position Number of interviewee Time in the company e years
Manager of the EDC 1 11
BU ﬁscal 1 6
Operations coordinator 1 6
Logistics 1 7
Operating leaders 2 10e13
Maintenance leaders 2 11
Operators 24 2e5
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Systematic observation of work activities and semi-structured
interviews provided data on natural interactions between
observed operators during daily work activities. Field notes (sup-
ported in some cases by audio and video recording) were reﬁned
and categorized for their applicability in FRAM analyses.
The research group had total access to the EDC facilities, and
EDC units were where data collections primarily took place. Semi-
structured interviews guided conversations regarding operators'
in-ﬁeld and in-base activities, needs and constraints, and served to
identify variabilities within the dynamic environment. Retrospec-
tive verbal protocols were also used to record information that
could not be fully detailed during direct observation of ﬁeld work
activities or for which the research group did not have access.
In addition to systematic observations at EDC bases, data were
collected during 2 emergency training scenarios in an attempt to
describe emergency response actions within the context of normal
operations. One emergency training scenario occurred in a canal at
the associated reﬁnery, and the other in the Guanabara Bay, which
are each considered risk zones and vulnerable areas by the EDC.
Data collection focused on work activities during response actions
which entail interactions between operators, between the opera-
tors and procedures, and between the operators and the equipment
used in the emergency situation.
The combination of observing daily work activities and emer-
gency training scenarios, and using retrospective verbal protocols
to ﬁll in details proved adequate to establish a knowledge base of
likely behavior during response actions. Although observing actual
emergency situations would have provided richer data, for reasons
related to safety and access to oil spill locations, the FRAMmodel is
still appropriate because of the emphasis on understanding normal
operational conditions and how non-normal events are the out-
comes of emergent variability in the system.4. Results
4.1. FRAM in oil spill response actions in a reﬁnery canal
Petroleum production at a reﬁnery involves a many-staged
process. One stage is the Oil/Water Separating process (OWS),
which continuously separates oil from the pluvial water and from
the reﬁnery efﬂuents. This process is common in oil reﬁneries,
petrochemical plants, chemical plants, and other industrial facil-
ities, and is used for resource/waste recovery as well as for envi-
ronmental reasons. The reﬁnery efﬂuents containing no more than
three parts per million of wastewater are legally discharged in the
Iguaçu River and in the Guanabara Bay (Fig. 3), as permitted under
the Brazilian National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES).
In the reﬁnery canal, most of the EDC's response actions take
place during rainy season. During this time, the Oil/Water Sepa-
rating process tank is more likely to overﬂow and leak oil into the
reﬁnery canal, spread over the water surface by current and wind.These factors are taken into account when considering the opera-
bility of physical countermeasures deﬁned in the response actions
plan.
As primary equipment for response operations, eighteen launch
sites for preventive and sorbent booms are located along the re-
ﬁnery canal in strategic places to mitigate spills from the OWS
process tank (Fig. 4). When the tank overﬂows, however, the
increased water current speed can decrease the usefulness of these
booms because large amounts of oil which may be initially con-
tained by the booms can be swept underneath or splash over the
boom ﬂoats.
Stopping the spilled oil from reaching the Iguaçu River and other
sensitive areas in the canal requires additional recovery response
actions to be undertaken by spill responders. Fig. 5 shows a generic
description of the response service processes and how the EDC,
Business Unit and EDC managers are involved in these processes
until the emergency is resolved.
A basic procedure for contingency and strategic planning of EDC
response can be described in the following sequence:
1) Oil spill incident: an incident of sufﬁcient impact occurs, such as
when theWOS process tank overﬂows. Following the incident, a
service request is issued and the EDC operators prepare to react,
but must wait for the request to be formalized and approved
before initiating emergency response service.
2) Actuation: the formal response service request is communicated
to the EDC through an emergency phone. Any available infor-
mation about the incident (i.e., kind of product spilled, amount,
where, phone number to contact a representative of the incident
and so forth) is recorded in a standardized form by EDC
operators.
3) Measurement of resource availability: The manager of the EDC
and the operating leader travel to the emergency area to analyze
the real conditions around the incident (i.e., level of the canal
water, conditions of the preventive booms, position of the oil
slicks, water current, etc.). Their objective is to estimate the
resources needed to structure a preliminary response strategy.
The response strategy may change as the situation evolves,
sometimes requiring more or new types of resources. These
resources must then be approved by the Business Unit (BU) and
the EDC manager.
4) Response actions: When resources are approved, mitigating ac-
tions begin, following tactical/operational speciﬁcations of the
response plan. These actions can include mobilizing and trans-
porting resources to the emergency area, deploying contain-
ment and sorbent booms, gathering the spilled oil, monitoring
the process, and so forth.
5) Closure: When the spill is sufﬁciently contained and cleaned, the
emergency coordinator formally declares the conclusion of
response activities. All personnel involved in the response are
then demobilized and perform maintenance on used
equipment.
Fig. 3. Vulnerable areas near to the reﬁnery.Google maps, 06/2014.
Fig. 4. Preventive booms along the reﬁnery canal. Google maps, 06/2014.
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evaluation document provided by the EDC to assess the quality
of response, identifying any noncompliance or noteworthy issue
that affected the overall success of the operation. These issues
are discussed with the EDC manager, who must also look for
good practices which can be used to inform training materials
that can be published and/or distributed to other EDC units.The description of the event and each phase of the service
process can provide a preliminary scope and framework for the
sociotechnical system to be analyzed. Table 4 shows some impor-
tant points to be considered during the FRAM analysis (Table 5).4.2. Identiﬁcation and characterization of essential EDC functions
After a request for service in an oil spill incident, the EDC plans a
Fig. 5. Response service task description.
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request demands. This means that the EDC selects the appropriate
equipment (appropriate setting factors) and the technique
(appropriate operational factors and contingency functions or tac-
tics: how, who, where, when) to be deployed in the ﬁeld to contain
and gather the spilled oil from the canal. Contingency plans with
adaptive capacities allow the EDC to cope with variations in the
external environment (the oil spill) and in the overall condition of
the response system, including the necessary resources (such as
those listed in Table 4). Without a tactical plan that encompasses all
contingency functions (and variations) involved in the response
activities, the system operates in a complete adhoc (trial and error)
basis with little control. Such a situation that may lead tounexpected and, sometimes, unwanted outcomes.
FRAM was therefore used to analyze the essential functions in
planning a response strategy. The functions include: (1) spill
assessment, (2) development of a response strategy/tactics, (3)
identifying and providing resources, (4) preparation of resources,
(5) mobilizing operators, and (6) executing response strategy/tac-
tics. These functions have been described in terms of six FRAM
analytical elements, and coupling linkages are added to denote
critical relationships among elements in the normally functioning
defense system. These relationships can be speciﬁed as de-
pendencies among the functions, as shown in Fig. 6 diagram.
Each spill requires a speciﬁc resource strategy and tactical plan
written in a speciﬁc form, and for that strategy/plan to be veriﬁed,
Table 4
Emergency scenario.
Event Scenario
Overﬂows of the tank of Oil/Water Separation  Heavy amount of oil released in the river.
 Weather conditions daily changing.
 Several actuating points working simultaneously.
 Oil passing over and underneath the preventive booms due to the current.
 Booms at jetty are insufﬁcient to deﬂect the oil from nearly sensitive areas.
Preparedness
 Basic equipment is available at the base including contingency and preventive booms, working boat, pumps and temporary storage.
 On-ﬁeld equipment available including working boat.
 Personnel trained to operate the equipment use during the emergency.
 Equipment well maintained.
 Operating 24 h in three working shift.
Response
 Contain the spilled oil
 Protect sensitive areas
 Deﬂect contingency booms in order to
 Gather the spilled oil
Table 5
Characterization and rating of the Common Performance Conditions.
Function: Develop a response strategy
Common performance conditions Rating
C1 Resource availability (personnel & equipment) A
C2 Training and experience (competence) A
C3 Quality of communications (team, organization) A
C4 Quality of HMI and operational support e
C5 Access to methods and procedures I
C6 Working conditions I
C7 Number of goals and conﬂict resolutions M
C8 Time available, time pressure M
C9 Circadian rhythm, stress M
C10 Quality of team collaboration A
C11 Quality of organizational support A
Variability
C5 This CPC is inadequate because although there are some performance standards (containment, recovery,
temporary storage, protection strategy, and so forth) they are not adequate to meet speciﬁc situations of real
scenarios at the canal. Therefore, response strategies are planned adhoc without much support, using pencil
and paper.
C6 The lack of a silent workplace can cause attention deﬁcit and concentration at the time to perform this function.
C7 This CPC is unpredictable; therefore, the variability is high because the number of goals and conﬂict resolution
depends on the number of actuation points that need a particular response strategy. If so, this interferes with
the number of decisions made and the strategies that need to be planned and/or operationalized.
C8 This CPC is unpredictable; therefore, performance variability is high. The emergency situation can change at
any time for several factors, mainly because of the wind and the canal current, which can change over time the
location of the oil that should be contained and collected. This means that the function < develop a response
strategy > should be done in the shortest time possible so it is implemented immediately to attend the
demands of the current emergency situation.
C9 This CCD is unpredictable; therefore, performance variability is high. Emergencies could emerge at any time of
day (day/night) and require immediate response to mitigate the negative impacts of the spill. Lack of adequate
sleep and rest can affect the performance of the operator during his work activities. The operator who develops
the response strategies (operation leader or manager) also works in the ﬁeld executing activities that require
physical effort, which can cause stress and fatigue and consequently, increase the variability of the function.
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function is carried out by humans without the aid of planning tools
(computerized or even paper forms), and planning actions have
time constraints in order to deliver timely responses. Therefore, in
many response situations, planning actions are governed by the
efﬁciency-thoroughness (ETTO) principle (Hollnagel, 2012) and are
conducted in adhoc fashion, often leading to the response plan
being formally stored only in the head of the response operators
andmanagers. This can be problematic when response actions have
high variability (such as rapid performance changes due to inter-
acting system factors) and when the range of observable perfor-
mance levels is large in amplitude. The overall response is therefore
subject to undesired variability from a number of internal and
external factors that can be represented by Common PerformanceConditions (Hollnagel, 2012). For the purpose of determining
whether a function is likely to vary given a speciﬁc scenario and set
of working conditions, each Common Performance Condition is
characterized and categorized as one of the following:
 Adequate (A): performance variability is assumed to be small,
and consequences/effects of variability are not noticeable.
 Inadequate (I): performance variability is assumed to be
noticeable.
 Unpredictable (U): performance variability is assumed to be
high.
 Not applicable (–): This categorization is assigned when the
Common Performance Condition does not apply to the function.
Fig. 6. FRAM describing the essential function to plan a response strategy.
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below.
Develop a response strategy/tactics function. The purpose of this
function is to determine deployment procedures, roles clearly
deﬁned for all areas, actuation points, teams, types and amounts of
resources needed according to everyday demands. Everyday de-
mands at the reﬁnery canal can include continuously containing oil
from the water surface while it is spilled during normal operations.
Oil has to be removed at the rate at which it accumulates; other-
wise it will build up and eventually cause boom failures. According
to the operators, dragging the oil to remove it from sensitive areas
such as near the canal border is one of the largest challenges in
current operations. In order to perform this activity, the contin-
gency booms need tomaintain a stable position in thewater but are
under the inﬂuence of currents and wind, and their position tends
to ﬂuctuate during response.
As indicated above, oil spill emergencies are evolving occur-
rences. As such, regular amendments to plans may be required to
initialize different actions or adapt existing actions to best support
response. It is therefore difﬁcult and also insufﬁcient to deﬁne
predetermined response strategies regarding methods, procedures,
and resources (kits) that can cope with the entire range of oil spill
response actions. As indicated by resilience engineering, the central
issue for an adequate response is the adaptive capabilities of the
response team and the resources currently available for alternative
response actions.
At this EDC, the development of the response strategy is
currently carried out by the operating leader, who has 14 years of
experience in the current position as well as additional past
experience. The most important CPC of the develop a response
strategy function is the ability to adequately match aspects of the
current spill to those of previous ones, which provides data for
decisions about resources needed, and the tactics (how, who,where, when) for using available resources.
At the EDC base, the spill response leader uses pen and paper to
draft and structure the response strategy. This includes creating an
intermediate action object to explain how the strategy works and
what equipment should be provided, and to prepare and mobilize
people to the emergency area. The response strategy/tactic is then
validated with ﬁeld responders, the manager and the Business Unit
representative. After approval, a request is ﬁled to release the
necessary equipment for the response actions and send it to the
emergency area.
Spill assessment function. At this stage the current situation and
the potential severity of the oil spill is assessed. The aim of this
preliminary assessment is to verify and gather ﬁeld information for
developing an accurate response strategy according to the emer-
gency demands. This function takes place at the emergency area
where the two most experienced operators (the EDC manager and
the operating leader) observe, identify the critical points to be
prioritized for immediate actions, and discuss strategy and tactics
to complement the ongoing response. They use tacit knowledge
and simple actions to collect and assess ﬁeld data, such as throwing
a stone into the oil slicks to determine its thickness on the surface
(and thus accumulated in the contingency booms) and identifying
whirlpools to assess if there is moving water in the canal. They also
assess the water level of the canal and weather conditions that may
inﬂuence the behavior of oil slicks (e.g., wind and temperature).
After the preliminary spill assessment, the responders return to the
EDC base “to put the strategy in paper”. The assessment is unlikely
to remain accurate for long periods of time because of the nature of
oil and surrounding weather, thus surveillance and follow-up as-
sessments of the spill may be necessary. These additional assess-
ments are carried out by the ﬁeld responders during response
activities, and operators communicate any changes or difﬁculties
during the continuing operations to the operating leader.
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precondition of adequate training and experience. The spill
responder should have suitable competencies to support assessing
and identifying any important changes or needs in any emergency
situation.
Provide resources function. This function is carried out through
logistical support after the response strategy has been planned. It is
the administrative procedure to provide resources and to coordi-
nate and verify the availability, location and documentation of
equipment and personnel in a timely manner. This can be
complicated at times because the response equipment comes from
4 different locations, described below.
 EDC base: The stockpiles of equipment for addressing tier 1, 2,
and 3 spills are held by the EDC at the base. These equipment
can include contingency and sorbent booms, crane, working
boat, pickup trucks, ropes, cables, skimmers, pumps, etc.
Equipment maintenance and preparation activities are per-
formed here as well.
 Service company (reﬁnery) and Business Unit: The reﬁnery
stores suction equipment which can be used to remove oil from
the canal. However, due to the need to cover a broad surface
area, it is commonly necessary to charter a service company to
provide additional suction equipment and assist in response
operations.
 Supplier: When the requested response equipment is not
available at the base nor at the reﬁnery it is necessary to pur-
chase it from the pre-determined suppliers.
 Field: There are working boats and preventive booms located in
the ﬁeld to provide rapid response.
An important CPC of this function is sufﬁcient resource avail-
ability and organizational support. According to operators, under-
stafﬁng is a problem for this function, considering that each
actuating point requires 4 people to collect the oil and monitor the
spill recovery and 6 operators to drag the contingency booms. This
contributes to operator fatigue due to the intense physical effort
required and working conditions during response operations. Over
time, fatigue provides one source of internal variability. Another
source of variability is the availability of equipment andmaterials at
the base, and this also impacts worker fatigue, illustrating a de-
pendency between the factors.
Preparation function. This is the operational process of arranging
the requested response equipment and accessories in emergency
trailers. At the base, most heavy equipment and materials (con-
tingency booms, pumps, etc.) are manipulated with a forklift in
order to avoid high physical effort.
The requested response equipment needs to be checked,
accounted, documented and approved by the EDC manager and
authorized by the BU (following internal rules and procedures of
the reﬁnery) prior to being mobilized to the emergency area. Ac-
cording to responders, the bureaucratic process required to release
the response equipment unnecessarily delays the response time,
and consequently increases time pressure during ﬁeld activities.
The preparedness function involves the response staff creating
working groups, deﬁning roles, and collecting information about
the location of the actuating points, as well as where they are going
to operate according to the response strategy.
An essential CPC of the preparation function is sufﬁcient quality
of team collaboration and access to resource availability. The
response equipment should be available, prepared and transported
by the response staff in a timely manner, which requires team
collaboration.
Mobilization function. The purpose of this function is to mobilize
all resources required (personnel and equipment) for theemergency response to the actuating points. Most of the response
equipment is transported from the EDC base to the reﬁnery canal,
where it is then unloaded at the actuating point by hand, with at
least 4 operators required to execute this task. Each actuating point
requires speciﬁc resources and must be considered among other
logistical details during mobilization and distribution.
On-site equipment needs to be suitably located and arrange-
ments must be in place for rapid and effective response, as part of
the overall contingency arrangement. An important CPC of the
mobilization function is adequate organizational support to navigate
bureaucratic process and coordinate the transportation of response
resources to the reﬁnery canal.
5. Discussion
The analysis of a FRAM diagram (Fig. 6) indicates that oil spill
response success depends on adequate spill assessment and strat-
egy/tactical development functions, as each function is heavily
linked to each other function. An accurate estimation of spill situ-
ation is essential to determine an appropriate level of response to
be mobilized, and the development of effective strategies/tactics
(how, who, where when) are the basis for an adequate response.
The EDC is structured according to the traditional framework of
distributed control systems when developing contingency plans,
relying on remote supervisors to provide plans for multiple local
actors (Woods and Shattuck, 2000). FRAM analysis indicated that
planning should be viewed with the lens of situated action
(Suchman, 1987), structuring contingency plans around situation
assessments that are done quickly and may be changed on-the-ﬂy.
This compensates for the fact that strategies and tactics are often
inadequate to deal with an evolving emergency situation. Local
actors have access to the results of actions taken through their own
experience and those of their co-workers, and so they should also
be empowered to modify or adapt plans, based on their under-
standing of the plan intention and the range of possible actions.
EDC activities were therefore viewed according to Resilience
Engineering framework, which holds adaptive capacity as the key
issue for adequate system functioning. Following this perspective,
system improvements may be made by adjust procedures or
providing resources for faster development and approval of con-
tingency plans, which may be facilitated by establishing a set of
common and well-known basic response strategies. Also it is
important that operations emphasize supporting adaptation on-
the-ﬂy in plans and procedures, and the importance of collabora-
tion and sharing information about the evolution of the oil spill.
In the EDC and other highly-complex socio-technical systems,
safety should be managed from a proactive, rather than reactive
perspective identifying what might go wrong and addressing it
rather than reacting to failure events after they occur. Resilience
Engineering has consistently argued that safety is more than the
absence of accidents, incidents and failures. Everyday work suc-
ceeds because people try to make sure that things go right, because
they understand how the system works and try to ensure that the
system can continue to work effectively.
Using this rationale, we analyzed the EDC emergency system
through the lens of the Safety II perspective (Hollnagel, 2014). The
Ergonomic ﬁeld studies provided an understanding of how
response activities are performed under conditions of normal
variability in order to support the FRAM modeling. These methods
provided critical model data, including the operational modes,
basic constraints, the cognitive skills and strategies used by oper-
ators to solve problems in everyday operations.
In the EDC as well as other complex systems, people with
different organizational and operational roles (individually,
collectively, and the organization) adjust what they do to ﬁt the
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development of the response strategy that is dependent on avail-
able time, information, materials, equipment, people, required
procedures, and other factors that may require adjustments. One of
these most interesting adjustments is that planning actions are
communicated verbally and the contingency plan is not formally
documented until after the response, and then mainly as a report
about the activities rather than a real action plan with objectives,
strategies and tactics. This is also done in an environment with
inadequate support for planning actions (write, approval) and
suffers under time pressure during the response. The ﬁnal plan
describes only the successful steps and hinders one's ability to see
the critical value of adaptations made from the original plan.
Also contributing to overall response performance are the
inherent problems of emergency response operations, such as
mandated but inefﬁcient activities and common resource limita-
tions. In the face of these problems, human experience can combat
them to plan a suitable response strategy. The human ability to
adapt, adjust, and ﬁnd effective ways of overcoming novel prob-
lems is the primary reasonwhy the oil spill response systemworks
as well as it does.
Because documented strategies are recorded as “work done”
rather than “work planned”, additional data sources were neces-
sary in this research. Therefore in addition to gathering and
analyzing the information of internal documents, additional data
collected included operator interview and ﬁeld observational data,
which could then be used to inform standard operating procedures
that specify methods, equipment and other operational factors to
be better prepared for a wider range of spills.
Performance adjustments and variability are the foundation for
everyday successful operation of the oil spill defense system.
However, there are situations where performance variability may
lead to undesirable outcomes. Fig. 6 shows the dynamic nature of
the planning functions and Table 4 shows some characterization of
the Common Performance Conditions (CPCs). The characterization
of performance variability is important because it determines the
quality of the function and thus the quality of overall system per-
formance. Both show several inadequate and unpredictable con-
ditions that may lead to degradation of performance. Finally, it can
be useful to establish some pre-conditions and basic resources as
CPCs for the proper operations of these functions.
6. Conclusion
This paper presented a systematic framework combining the
Functional Resonance Analysis Method and Ergonomic ﬁeld studies
to understand and model the performance variability of a complex
system. We believe that the Functional Resonance Analysis Method
provides an adequate methodological framework to model a
complex socio-technical system that operates to address emer-
gency situations under varying conditions.
The Ergonomic ﬁeld studies provided a thorough knowledge
base concerning EDC operator actions and behaviors. It is important
to note that the front-line operators are the ﬁeld experts and the
ones that know howcritical equipment and activities in the defense
system can be used effectively. EDC responders are not simply
performing a set of task procedures and rules, they are trying to get
things done with the best possible conditions and this study seeks
to shed light on how. Therefore what operators do, how they think,
what they know and how they organize and structure information
is important to understand as part of the overall study of the
system.
Following the FRAM method and with an appreciation for
Resilience Engineering principles, this study took into account how
functions are carried out in normal working conditions, withequipment functioning normally, in a common response situation
of an overﬂowing Oil/Water Separation tank. Knowing how things
operate successfully and what is being achieved by the EDC oper-
ations (based on Safety II approach) provides insight into ways to
increase the overall resilience of the oil spill emergency response
systems.
Performance variability to a large extent is the product of
intentional adjustments that operators undertake in order to
accomplish their task in the presence of other sources of system
variability. People and organizations adjust their activity to the
working conditions or context and try to balance efﬁciency and
thoroughness both on the level of speciﬁc actions and overall
strategies. Performance adjustments are always required but rarely
recorded in “work done” documents, which suggests a value for
more proactive approaches that can guide the adjustment process.
This would allow EDC operators to be better able to develop a
suitable response strategy with consideration for common patterns
in what responders do, what responders will do, what technology
may do and how processes develop during the emergency
situation.
The study shows that performance variability is not only normal
and necessary to system operations but also indispensable to cope
with resource limitations of the system. Variability should there-
fore not be treated as the consequence of violation or noncompli-
ance, but instead as a beneﬁcial emergent property for managing
safety in a complex socio-technical system.
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